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IS ARBITRATION LAWLESS?
ChristopherR. Drahozal*
I. INTRODUCTION

Is arbitration "lawless"? The question is not a new one. In a
1944 article in the Yale Law Journal, Heinrich Kronstein wrote that
"[n]o theory in support of organized arbitration can conceal the
essential 'lawlessness' of this form of 'private government.""
Kronstein explained further in subsequent writing:
Arbitration is power, and courts are forbidden to look
The protection of awards against judicial
behind it.
interference and, under that umbrella, of the development of
organized arbitration as a rule-maker have established
"judicial powers" other than those provided by federal and
state constitutions. It is not possible to maintain any legally
established policy or order in domestic and international
trade, whether it is an order of free competition protected
by antitrust legislation or any other type of economic order
provided by law, if courts abdicate their power in favor of
private tribunals serving private interests. American courts
are presently confronted with a conflict with such private
courts. In the face of the current trends in our society, the
central concept of a social regime whose exclusive ordering
is the totality of legislative and judicial mandates, has been
weakened by the cession of segments of the law to
organized arbitration.'
Although Kronstein focused on arbitration's effect on the
enforcement of the antitrust laws, he made clear that his concern
. John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. I
appreciate
helpful comments from Steve Ware and Paul Kirgis, and am grateful for research support from
the University of Kansas School of Law and the University of Kansas General Research Fund.
1. Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrumentof Private Government, 54 YALE
L.J. 36, 66 (1944).
2. Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 661, 699-700 (1963).
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extended as well to "any other type of economic order provided by
law."3
Contemporary commentators in a variety of contexts likewise
have described arbitration as lawless. According to Philip J.
McConnaughay, "[i]nternational commercial arbitrations today are
virtually lawless, or at least they can be, at the election of the parties
or the private arbitrators who serve them."'4 Edward Brunet states
While securities
that "securities arbitration remains lawless ....
arbitration surely operates in the 'shadow of the law,' it is clear that
the arbitrators need not apply law."5 Kenneth S. Abraham and J.W.
Montgomery, III, writing about the arbitration of insurance disputes,
argue that "arbitration often involves a form of contractual
'lawlessness' that is especially undesirable in claims that involve
new legal issues. This lawlessness not only adversely affects the
parties to each dispute, but the legal system as a whole."6 Although
not using the word "lawless," Charles L. Knapp expresses concerns
similar to those of Kronstein:
[D]enial of access to a court of law in most cases means
exactly that--denial of access not merely to a court, or even
to a jury, but to the law itself ....

[A]rbitrators in most

cases are not bound to follow the law, nor are their
decisions appealable to a court of law for any but the most
3. Id. at 699.
4. Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at
International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 453 (1999); see also Linda
Silberman, InternationalArbitration: Comments from a Critic, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 11
(2002) ("An even more basic flaw of international arbitration is its almost 'lawless' character as
[T]here is no real context for and no real check on arbitrators'
regards national law....
rulings.").
5. Edward Brunet, Toward ChangingModels of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV.
1459, 1484 (1996); see also Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZo L. REV. 991, 1040 (2002) ("While it seems
that an investor may have difficulty prevailing in court under the established law, arbitration
panels, on more than an occasional basis, are reaching decisions favorable to investors even
where the 'law is clear' that there is no basis for imposing liability on the broker."); Jennifer J.
Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84
N.C. L. REV. 123, 140 (2005) ("[T]here is no meaningful judicial oversight to ensure that
arbitrators are applying the law, and limited evidence on the ground suggests that [Self
Regulatory Organization ("SRO")] panels may not in fact apply the law.").
6. Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness ofArbitration, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 355, 357 (2003); see also Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration:The Destruction
of the Common Law, 2 J. Am. ARB. 1, 11 (2003) ("Even assuming an arbitrator is committed to
following the law, however, he or she cannot make it. Therein lies the problem.... Arbitration
eliminates litigation in a public forum, precedent-establishing decisions, and stare decisis.").
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egregious of defects. Mere failure to follow the law is not
such a defect. The result is that whatever the rules of law
may be, arbitrators are not bound to follow them, and their
handiwork is subject to only the most perfunctory of
judicial oversight. Arbitrators of course may choose to
follow the law-nothing requires them not to-but if they
do, it's not because they have any obligation to do so, and
it's not something that a litigant or her attorney can count
on going in. Knowledgeable attorneys may have some
sense of the approach that an arbitration panel is likely to
take to a given type of case. Still, the arbitrators bring their
own "law" with them, and they take it with them when they
leave.7
Knapp concludes that "the pressure for mandatory arbitration
represents another step, and a giant one, in the privatization of
American contract law,"8 warning that "[t]he piece-by-piece
dismantling of American contract law is happening under our noses,
right now."9
But while concern about the "lawlessness" of arbitration is
widespread,"° what the commentators mean by "lawless" varies.1"
The most common meaning is simply that arbitrators are not required
to follow the law in making their awards. 2 Courts regularly state
that arbitrators need not follow the law, 3 and commentators have
described the arbitration process (in the United States at least) as
involving decisions based on equity and fairness rather than legal

7. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in ContractLaw, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 782-83 (2002).
8. Id. at 765.
9. Id. at 766.
10. Of course, some commentators disagree with the description of arbitration as "lawless."
E.g., William W. Park, The Specificity of InternationalArbitration: The Casefor FAA Reform, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1290 n.217 (2003) ("The assertion that arbitrators are allowed to
be lawless is at odds with the existence of 'manifest disregard of the law' as a standard for
judicial review, and [is] inconsistent with the provisions of many arbitration rules.").
11. Some commentators include procedural differences between arbitration and litigation as
examples of the "lawlessness" of arbitration. See, e.g., McConnaughay, supra note 4, at 454
(including "its procedural irregularity" as an element of "international arbitration's lawlessness").
I limit my focus here to the application of substantive law in arbitration.
12. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 5, at 1484.
13. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 720 n.82 (1999) (citing cases).
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obligation. 4 A second meaning is that parties to arbitration
agreements-or more precisely, businesses that include arbitration
agreements in their standard form contracts with consumers and
employees-use arbitration to avoid application of legal rules
protecting consumers and employees. Because arbitrators need not
follow the law, businesses can avoid consumer and employee
protection rules 5 ("self-deregulate," to use Paul Carrington's phrase)
by having disputes resolved in arbitration instead of court. 6 A third
meaning is that arbitration impedes the creation of law by the courts.
When disputes are arbitrated rather than litigated, the outcome may
be unreasoned and unpublished arbitration awards rather than
published and precedential court opinions.
This article examines the empirical evidence underlying these
various views of arbitral lawlessness. It considers what we know
about three related empirical questions: (1) Do arbitrators follow the
law in making their awards?; (2) Do businesses provide for
arbitration to avoid mandatory legal rules?; and (3) To what extent
does arbitration interfere with the development of the law? Certainly
much more research needs to be done. But, perhaps surprisingly, the
available empirical evidence to date provides at best weak support
for the view that arbitration is "lawless."' 7 There is evidence that
arbitrators do not treat statutory issues in as much detail as courts,
14. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
331,344-45.
Commercial arbitration, at least as it is practiced in America, is a method of dispute
resolution, but not necessarily a method of enforcing legal rights.... A Latin phrase
sometimes employed to describe the spirit of much American commercial arbitration is
ex aequo et bono-a resolution is sought that is equitable, minimizes harm to either
party, and enables potential adversaries to maintain a valuable commercial
relationship; the role of such an arbitrator is said in Europe to be that of an amiable
compositeur. It is said of the American commercial arbitrator that he "may do justice
as he sees it, applying his own sense of the law and equity to the facts as he finds them
to be and making an award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the agreement."
Id.
15. The mandatory rules can be either statutory or derived from the common law. See Ware,
supra note 13, at 732-33.
16. Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 369-70
(2002).
17. Of course, juries frequently are criticized as "lawless," so maybe these results are not so
surprising after all. Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 205, 205 (2001) ("Much of the recent criticism of the American trial focuses on its
perceived 'lawlessness.'
Commentators have accused juries of making decisions based on
emotion and prejudice, all the way up to explicit nullification.").
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but little other evidence that arbitrators definitively differ from
judges in their attitudes and practices toward legal issues. 8 Studies
find no indication that parties agree to arbitrate to avoid mandatory
legal rules, even when they have the opportunity and incentive to do
so.' 9 Finally, whether arbitration interferes with the development of
the law is extremely difficult to evaluate. Certainly many arbitration
awards are not published; but there is some evidence that published
awards serve as precedent (persuasive rather than binding) in
subsequent arbitrations.2"
A few qualifications: First, this article does not attempt to
canvass the theoretical arguments in support of the assertions of
arbitral lawlessness. In my view, those arguments are largely
indeterminate because of the difficulty of evaluating reputational
constraints on arbitral decision making. Nor does this article
consider the normative issue of whether arbitrators should follow the
law-i.e., whether the benefits of the asserted "lawlessness" of
arbitration outweigh the costs.2' Finally, it does not analyze how to
make it more likely that arbitrators will follow the law. Others
already have made important efforts in this regard." Instead, this
article focuses on what the available empirical evidence suggests
about the "lawlessness" of arbitration.
II. Do ARBITRATORS FOLLOW THE LAW?
Stephen J. Ware states flatly: "[A]rbitrators often do not apply
the law."23 There certainly is reason to wonder. An arbitrator's
18. See infra text accompanying notes 41-98.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 99-119.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 120-155.
21. For authors who have discussed this issue, see, e.g., McConnaughay, supra note 4, at
459 ("'Lawlessness' in international commercial arbitration... has virtues as well as
risks ....
");Ware, supra note 13, at 711 ("Contracting out of law through arbitration agreements
does not necessarily mean that such law will be under-enforced in the sense that plaintiffs 'do
worse' in arbitration than they would have done in court. In some cases, arbitrators reach a more
'pro-plaintiff result than a court would have reached ....
").
22. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and
Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279 passim (2000) (imposing liability on arbitrators for failing
to follow law); Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonizationof InternationalCommercial
Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 647 passim (1999) (random selection of awards
for review); see also Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REv. 69, 118
(2006) (random selection of awards for traditional adjudication, coupled with multiplier to fee or
penalty).
23. Ware, supra note 13, at 725.
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authority is based on contract,24 so that arbitrators have limited
incentive to consider the effects of their awards on third parties. If
faced with a choice between a decision preferred by the parties or
one that follows the law, arbitrators have an incentive to choose the
former.25 In addition, many arbitration awards contain no statement
of reasons, so that it is difficult if not impossible for courts to
determine whether in fact the arbitrators have followed the law.26
Finally, court review of arbitration awards is largely based on
procedural grounds. In the United States, the only substantive
ground for vacating an award is if it is made in "manifest disregard"
of the law.27 Thus, even if a court determines that the arbitrators did
not follow the law, in most cases the court will uphold the award. 8
On the other hand, some commentators argue that arbitrators in
fact ordinarily do follow the law. According to Alan Scott Rau:
Now I imagine it is fair to say that arbitrators usually
do try their best to model their awards on what courts
would do in similar cases-and that as often as not they
succeed in doing so. That is at least what the scanty
empirical evidence seems to suggest, and it corresponds as
well to a plausible account of the likely nature of arbitrator
incentives. What courts and codes have previously said is a

24. See id. at 726-27.
25. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 14, at 346.
Even International Chamber of Commerce arbitrators are dependent for their careers,
to a degree that no judges are, on the acceptability of their awards to the parties, and
perhaps especially on their acceptability to parties who are "repeat players." This
circumstance creates pressure on arbitrators to appear to be considerate of the interests
of all parties, even those who have sorely abused the rights of others.
Id.
26. EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 324-25 (1997). By comparison, reasoned awards are the norm in
international arbitration. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark, Commentary, in
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
255 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005).
27. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (dicta); Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (dicta); see Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied
Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 566-68 (2005) (discussing history and acceptance
of "manifest disregard" ground for judicial review of arbitral awards).
28. E.g., Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("(S]ince 1960 we have vacated some part or all of an arbitral award for manifest
disregard in the following four out of at least 48 cases where we applied the standard .... ");
Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 670 (6th Cir. 2000) (identifying only two U.S. Court of
Appeals cases vacating awards for manifest disregard of the law).
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natural starting point, after all-while inertia often does the
rest-to the point that deciding in conformity with these
rules of law will often simply appear to the arbitrator to be
the path of least resistance. It is also most likely to be
congruent with the ex ante expectations of contracting
parties, who-behind the proverbial veil of ignorancemay not have supposed that in drafting an arbitration
clause, they were entirely surrendering the right to have
their conduct judged by external legal standards. Above all
perhaps, arbitrators may be expected to act in such a way as
to maximize the likelihood that their awards will be
enforceable in all jurisdictions where review is likely-a
vacated or unrecognized award being a fiasco, a sign of
fecklessness or irresponsibility that hardly enhances market
credibility.29
In addition, Donald Donovan and Alexander Greenawalt argue that,
at least in international arbitration, administering institutions act as a
further constraint on the selection of arbitrators who might ignore
mandatory rules of national law.3" They conclude that "[a]lthough
we cannot exclude out of hand the theoretical possibility that
international arbitration of mandatory rules might lead to underenforcement of those rules, we do not believe that the proposition
can be established by reference to theoretical economic incentives
29. Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons ofADR, 40 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 449, 514-15 (2005).
30. Donald Francis Donovan & Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Mitsubishi After Twenty Years:
Mandatory Rules Before Courts and International Arbitrators, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11, 36-38 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006).
We are skeptical that this theory [that appointing authorities have an incentive to
select otherwise neutral arbitrators who exhibit a particular bias against mandatory
rules per se] presents a credible picture of the world of international arbitration as it
actually operates. It begins with a simple theoretical assumption-that in certain cases
some parties at the time of contracting will have some unquantified incentive to avoid
application of mandatory rules. But the mere fact that this may be the case does not
yield the assumption that this impulse has sufficient weight to drive the economics of
appointing authorities to the point that these institutions will exhibit systemic bias in
favor of appointing arbitrators who will both entertain and deny meritorious mandatory
rules claims, or that a steady supply of arbitrators exists who both fit this specific bill
and meet the qualifications more generally demanded of arbitrators.
Id. But see David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 33, 61 (1997)
("Even the independent arbitration companies have an economic interest in being looked on
kindly by large institutional corporate defendants who can bring repeat business.").

194
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alone."'"
I agree. Ultimately, the claim, at least as stated by Ware, is an
empirical one-not merely that arbitrators might not follow the law,
or that any mistakes they might make will not be corrected, but that
they "often do not apply the law."32 Of course, what one means by
"often" varies depending on the context and the individual.33 Thus, a
more precise statement of the question is: "how often" do arbitrators
not follow the law?34 The empirical evidence on this point-which
consists of case analyses, surveys of arbitrators, and reversal rates of
arbitration awards and court decisions-is varied but ultimately
inconclusive.
One initial point: statements in court opinions that arbitrators
need not follow the law are not (despite some suggestion to the
contrary35 ) empirical descriptions of what arbitrators do. Indeed, one
would have to wonder how courts could obtain empirical insights
into arbitral decision making denied to everyone else. 6 Instead, such
statements are about the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards.
If the parties' contract requires the arbitrators to follow law, then
courts are to review the arbitrators' legal rulings de novo.37 In cases
in which the arbitrators need not follow the law, which is the default
rule in American law, then courts apply the usual deferential
31. Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 38.
32. Ware, supra note 13, at 725.
33. Michaela Wdnke, ConversationalNorms and the Interpretationof Vague Quantifiers, 16
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 301, 301 (2002) ("Vague quantifiers are quite vague. One
respondent's interpretation of what 'fairly often' means exactly and into how many hours or
instances this translates does not necessarily correspond to that of another respondent ....
");see
also Norman M. Bradburn & Carrie Miles, Vague Quantifiers,43 PUB. OPINION Q. 92, 92 (1979)
("[W]e know little about the characteristics of such quantifying adverbs.").
34. Another uncertainty is what it means to "follow the law" or "apply the law" in a
decision. Do arbitrators not follow the law when they fail to apply legal precedent by mistake, or
only when they knowingly disregard the precedent that a court would follow? Can courts of last
resort ever fail to "follow the law" given that no higher court can reverse their decision? This
jurisprudential question is well beyond the scope of this paper.
35. Ware, supra note 13, at 720 & n.82 ("Even courts have explicitly acknowledged that
arbitrators often do not apply the law.").
36. Even if a particular court reviewed a steady stream of arbitration awards that did not
apply the law (of which there is no evidence), the court is unlikely to have reliable information on
whether such awards occur often-relative to the universe of arbitration awards (many of which
never end up in court). Certainly to the extent court opinions make what seem to be empirical
assertions about arbitral decision making, see id., they provide no indication of the empirical
basis for those assertions.
37. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory
Rules, and JudicialReview ofArbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 431-33 (2003).
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standard of review. 8 Similarly, the Supreme Court's repeated
admonition that "there is no reason to assume at the outset that
arbitrators will not follow the law"39 is not an empirical statement
that arbitrators ordinarily do follow the law. Rather, it rejects any
assumption that arbitrators do not apply the law as a basis for
refusing to enforce arbitration agreements, instead reserving the issue
for judicial review after the award is made.4"
A. Case Analyses
Certainly there is anecdotal evidence that arbitrators do not
always follow the law-in the form of arbitral decisions that differ
from what commentators believe courts would have decided on the
same facts. Paul Kirgis cites DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.-in which the Second Circuit concluded that the arbitrators
had incorrectly applied the law but refused to vacate the award
because it was not in manifest disregard of the law-as illustrating
the point.42 Commentators likewise have described awards by
securities arbitration panels that were apparently contrary to settled
law.43 But of course anecdotes, even if they demonstrate that some
arbitrators fail to apply the law, cannot show how often such failures
occur relative to the total number of arbitration awards.
A study by Patricia A. Greenfield of a sample of labor
arbitration awards provides mixed evidence on the extent to which
arbitrators follow the law. Greenfield reviewed 106 labor arbitration
awards from 1983 to 1985 in which parties had asserted an unfair
labor practice claim with the National Labor Relations Board.44 She
found that arbitrators cited the relevant statutes in 51.9 percent of the
awards, did not cite relevant statutes in 36.8 percent of the awards,
38. See id.
39. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
40. Id. ("[A]ithough judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.").
41. 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997).
42. Paul F. Kirgis, The ContractarianModel ofArbitrationand Its Implicationsfor Judicial
Review ofArbitralAwards, 85 OR. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (2006).
43. Black & Gross, supra note 5, at 1040 ("[A]rbitration panels, on more than an occasional
basis, are reaching decisions favorable to investors even where the 'law is clear' that there is no
basis for imposing liability on the broker."); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 140 ("[L]imited
evidence on the ground suggests that SRO panels may not in fact apply the law.").
44. Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 683, 687 (1992).
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and expressly refused to consider the statutory issues in 7.5 percent
of the awards.45 Arbitrators were much more likely to cite relevant
statutes when the parties raised the issue in their pleadings; the
arbitrators considered the statutory issue in only 15.4 percent of the
cases in which parties did not raise it. 46 Although arbitrators cited

statutes more frequently than she expected, Greenfield found that
"arbitrators' consideration of the statutory issues [was] often cursory
and conclusory, almost an afterthought to the contractual issue. 47
As a result, she concluded that "few arbitrators consider statutory
rights fully and in detail.

'48

Greenfield's analysis does not purport to

determine whether fuller consideration of statutory issues would
have changed the result in any of the cases. 49 But it does raise
questions about the extent to which arbitrators follow the law: if the
arbitrators did not carefully analyze the statutory issue, how could
confidence that they had followed the law in making
they have any
5°
their award?
On the other hand, Donovan and Greenawalt point to the
absence of challenges to international arbitration awards for failure
to apply the law as evidence that international arbitrators do not
They cite "what may seem a
frequently disregard U.S. law."
stunning statistic": "In the two decades since Mitsubishi [Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.], it appears that U.S. courts

have decided only a single case in which a party has complained
45. Id. at 689.
46. Id. at 690.
47. Id. at 694.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 684.
50. A survey by Harry T. Edwards of members of the National Academy of Arbitrators
echoes some of Greenfield's findings:
The evidence as to whether and how many arbitrators are professionally competent
to decide legal issues in cases involving claims of employment discrimination is at best
mixed. Furthermore... the evidence from the survey suggests that even when
arbitrators are professionally competent to decide legal issues and when the arbitration
process is adequate to allow for full consideration of legal questions arising pursuant to
Title VII, still many arbitrators believe that they have no business interpreting or
applying a public statute in a contractual grievance dispute.
Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in
ARBITRATION-1975 at 59, 82 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1976). Unlike the
Mentschikoff and Thomson surveys discussed infra text accompanying notes 57-62, the Edwards
survey did not ask arbitrators whether in fact they applied the law in making their awards.
51. Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 38.
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about an international tribunal's application of a statutory claim
implicating a U.S. mandatory rule."52 Given the incentive of losing
parties to raise any good faith ground for challenging an award,53 and
the dicta in the Supreme Court's Mitsubishi decision suggesting that
courts would review whether arbitrators applied the law when
deciding whether to enforce the award,54 the absence of such
challenges suggests one of two things: either that U.S. mandatory
rules claims do not play a major role in international arbitrations or
that arbitrators do a reasonably good job in adjudicating such
claims. 5 The losing parties who did not challenge international
arbitration awards thus are like Sherlock Holmes's "dog that did not
bark": 6 their lack of complaint about arbitrators' failure to apply the
law provides some basis for inferring that there was no such failure.
B. Surveys ofArbitrators

Others have pointed to surveys of arbitrators as evidence that
arbitrators often do not follow the law in their awards. A 1961
survey by Soia Mentschikoff found that 80 percent of the arbitrators
52. Id. The case was Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter International,Inc., No. 01-C-4809,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5475 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002), af'd, 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2003), which
on its facts "does not suggest that arbitrators will be poor stewards of U.S. public policy."
Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 39.
53. Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 39 ("One might be tempted to argue that the
lack of relevant case law results directly from the strictness of Mitsubishi itself: if a U.S. court can
do no more than verify that the arbitrators decided a mandatory rules question, what point is there
in seeking to overturn a bad decision? But that argument is not convincing given the time that
has elapsed and the debate (however unjustified) that has surrounded the decision.").
54. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985)
("Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United States will
have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed. ...
While the efficacy of the arbitral
process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would
not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims
and actually decided them.").
55. Donovan and Greenawalt explain:
To the extent that there was a substantial demand among parties to international
transactions to waive the application of U.S. mandatory rules, and to the extent that
arbitration was viewed as a means of achieving that waiver, one would have expected
Mitsubishi to result in an increase of arbitration agreements designed specifically to
remove enforcement of mandatory rules from the courts. The fact that the case law
does not reveal any such trend suggests that one or both of the necessary preconditions
have not been met.
Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 41.
56. Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 349
(1930).
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surveyed "thought that they ought to reach their decisions within the
context of the principles of substantive rules of law, but almost 90
per cent believed that they were free to ignore these rules whenever
they thought that more just decisions would be reached by so
doing.

57

She described the results as "curiously parallel to the

attitudes that seem to be implicit in our appellate courts."58
A more recent survey of construction arbitrators, published by
Dean B. Thomson in 1994, asked respondents whether they "always
follow the law in formulating [their] awards."59 Of those responding,
72 percent (149 of 207) answered "yes" while 20 percent (42 of 207)
answered "no" (8 percent did not answer the question).6"
Respondents were given the option of explaining their answers.6"
Thomson notes: "Of the 33 who explained their 'no' answer, 11
stated they did not know the law and therefore could not follow it.
Another 11 said they would not follow the law if it led to an
inequitable result.

62

Professors Ware and Rau discuss these survey findings in their
writings. Ware cites these surveys as reflecting a "widespread belief
among arbitrators that they are under no duty to apply the law."63 By
comparison, after considering both of the above studies, Rau states
the conclusion quoted in full above:' "I imagine it is fair to say that
arbitrators usually do try their best to model their awards on what
courts would do in similar cases-and that as often as not they
succeed in doing so. That is at least what the scanty empirical
,." Rau notes in particular
evidence seems to suggest .
were "curiously parallel to
her
results
that
s
comment
Mentschikoff
the attitudes that seem to be implicit in our appellate courts,"66 and
adds that the study was conducted "at a time long before it became
commonplace to entrust arbitrators with questions of mandatory,
57. Soia Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration,61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 861 (1961).
58. Id.
59. Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction
Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137, 154 (1994).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 155.
62. Id.
63. Ware, supra note 13, at 720-21.
64. See supra text accompanying note 29.
65. Rau, supra note 29, at 514.
66. Id. at 514 n.268 (quoting Mentschikoff, supra note 57, at 861).
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regulatory law"-suggesting that perhaps a similar survey would
have different results today.67 Rau also points out that construction
arbitrators often sit in panels of three including at least one lawyer,
so that one arbitrator may be familiar with the law even if another is
68
not.
I have three additional comments on these survey results. First,
the surveys provide little or no evidence on how frequently
arbitrators fail to apply the law in their awards. Neither of the
surveys asked the arbitrators how often they applied or did not apply
the law.69 The survey of construction arbitrators, for example, only
asked whether the arbitrator "always follow[ed] the law.""0 An
arbitrator who did not follow the law in making an award only once
in his or her career would answer the same as an arbitrator who never
followed the law. The survey provides no way to distinguish between
those two cases.
Second, the answers by arbitrators cannot be evaluated in an
absolute sense but only relative to other legal decision makers. How
would jurors or judges answer a similar question?7 Surveys of
prospective jurors reveal a significant willingness to disregard the
law in reaching a verdict. In the DecisionQuest/National Law
Journal 2000 Annual Juror Outlook Survey, 45 percent of all
respondents, and 69 percent of persons aged eighteen to twenty-four,
"agreed that in reaching a verdict, jurors should disregard a judge's
instructions if they believe justice will best be served by doing so."72
Studies of judicial attitudes toward following the law strike me as
revealing views similar to those reflected in the surveys of
arbitrators. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., found in his interviews with
federal court of appeals judges that 91.4 percent (thirty-two of thirtyfive) believed that precedent was "very important" in reaching

67. Id.
68. Id. at 514-15 n.268.
69. See Mentschikoff, supra note 57, at 861; Thomson, supra note 59, at 154-55.
70. Thomson, supra note 59, at 154.
71. This question necessarily reflects the view that judges, despite their law-making powers,
can, in fact, "fail[] to follow established law" in the sense the phrase is applied to arbitrators by
basing decisions on factors other than precedent. See id.
72. DecisionQuest & National Law Journal, 2000 Annual Juror Outlook, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
22-24, 2000, at 4, available at http://dqadmin.com/viewer.php?filename=2000 AJOS -webl.pdf;
see also Bob Van Voris, Jurors to Lawyers: Dare to Be Dull, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, at Al
(reporting results of survey).
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decisions when the precedent was "clear and relevant"; but 48.6
percent (seventeen of thirty-five) also ranked as "very important"
their "[p]ersonal views of justice in the case."" When precedent was
"absent or ambiguous," 74.3 percent (twenty-six of thirty-five) listed
the "[d]ictates of justice" as "very important" while 68.6 percent
(twenty-four of thirty-five) similarly ranked the "[c]losest precedent
in [the] circuit.

74

David E. Klein in his more recent interviews with

court of appeals' judges made similar findings: while 62.5 percent
(fifteen of twenty-four) of the judges listed making "[1]egally
[c]orrect [d]ecisions" as "very important," 25 percent (six of twentyfour) likewise ranked "[g]ood/j]ust [o]utcomes" as "very important"
as well.75 When the two goals conflict, Klein explained, some judges
"deny any legitimacy" to their personal views of justice, but "[m]ost
fell toward the middle of the continuum," giving some weight to both
goals.76
Third, as a general matter, people's responses to survey
questions about why they do what they do must be taken with a grain
of salt. People do not always understand why they act or do what
they say they do. Presumably that is true of arbitrators (and judges)
as well. As Klein has stated, "[j]udges cannot be expected to
understand their own motivations perfectly or to report them with
undiluted candor."77 Academics examining the determinants of actual
judicial decisions have found that while legal considerations "clearly
explain[] a significant part" of decision making by court of appeals
judges, "judicial ideology is also consistently a significant
determinant of some decisions."" At bottom, while the surveys of
arbitrators provide some reason to think that arbitrators do not
always follow the law in their awards, it is hard to know whether that
happens "often" or "more often" than in the courts.
73. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
164 tbl.6.2 (1981).
74. Id. at 165 tbl.6.3.
75. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW INTHE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 22 tbl.2.1
(2002).
76. Id. at 22.
77. Id. at 138.
78. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the US. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1457, 1514 (2003); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006) (noting
that ideological voting influences judicial decisions). See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002)
(examining attitudinal model as explaining U.S. Supreme Court decision making).
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C. Reversal Rates
Finally, the extent to which arbitration awards (or by analogy
court decisions) are reversed on review might provide some
indication of the extent to which arbitrators fail to follow the law:
frequent reversals of arbitration awards would suggest that arbitrators
often do not apply the law. But of course such consideration is
complicated by the deference usually given by courts to the merits of
arbitration awards.
Michele Hoyman and Lamont E. Stallworth used the
opportunity provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co.79 to compare arbitrator adjudications of
statutory claims to decisions by courts and agencies reviewing the
same claims de novo. 8° In Gardner-Denver,the Supreme Court held
that arbitration of a discrimination claim as a grievance in labor
union arbitration did not preclude the individual from later asserting
the claim in court." As a result, both courts and administrative
agencies could review the award on the discrimination claim without
the usual deference to the arbitrator's findings. Practitioners
surveyed by Hoyman and Stallworth reported handling 1761
discrimination grievances immediately after Gardner-Denver,484 of
which were reviewed by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") or a similar state agency and 307 of which
were relitigated in court.82 Of those reviewed, the EEOC or state
administrative agency reversed 15.9 percent; of those relitigated, the
court reversed 6.8 percent.8 3 As a percentage of all arbitration awards
identified by survey respondents, 4.4 percent were reversed8 4 by
administrative agencies and 1.2 percent were reversed by a court.
By comparison, Paul Kirgis cites reversal rates of district court
decisions by the federal courts of appeals as evidence-by analogythat "arbitrators who attempt to apply the law make relatively

79. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
80. Michele Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The Arbitration of Discrimination
Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, ARB. J., Sept. 1984, at 49.
81. 415 U.S. at 59-60 (permitting "trial de novo" of statutory discrimination claims).
82. Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 80, at 54-55.
83. Id. at 55.
84. Id. Notably, Hoyman and Stallworth did not examine the arbitration awards themselves,
but relied on the number of awards reported by survey respondents. Thus, the precision of their
results necessarily depends on the accuracy of the reports by their respondents.
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frequent mistakes."85 He uses civil rights cases as an example, and

explains:
While comprehensive data on reversal rates is not readily
available, it appears that between twenty-five and thirty
percent of appeals in civil rights cases result in a reversal, a

remand, or both. Even if many of these reversals are for
procedural errors, trial judges must be making significant
numbers of legal errors in applying federal civil rights
statutes. Arbitrators almost certainly are not better at
applying statutes than trial judges. They must make
reversible mistakes at least as often.86
Kirgis calculated the reversal rate in civil rights cases based on his
own Westlaw searches,87 but his figures are consistent with more
general data on reversal rates on appeal.88

Certainly, reversal rates of arbitration awards provide more
direct evidence of how arbitrators decide than reversal rates of court

decisions. Because the incentives of arbitrators differ from the
incentives of trial court judges, there is no reason to assume that
arbitrators will make errors at the same rate as trial court judges.
Arbitrators might, in fact, make fewer mistakes.89 Moreover, as

Kirgis notes, not all reversible errors involve erroneous application
of substantive legal principles.9 ° A recent study of state appeals
found that in only 20.5 percent of state court appeals studied was the
"primary" issue the "[m]isapplication of substantive law or
evidentiary law to the facts or improper jury instructions on law or
evidence."'" Instead, the substantial majority of appeals challenged

85. Kirgis, supra note 42, at 36.
86. Id., at 36-37.
87. Id., at 36 n.204.
88. E.g., THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, APPEALS FROM GENERAL
CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES, 201-2005, at 4 tbl.6 (June 2006) (noting that state
appellate court reversed in whole or in part 32.7 percent of appeals resolved on the merits); Jon 0.
Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 633 (1992) (finding that 27
percent of appellate decisions in civil cases reversed the district court in whole or in part).
89. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L.
REV. 469, 501-02 (1998); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private
Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 114-31 (2004) (comparing effect of behavioral
biases on jurors and arbitrators). Of course, arbitrators might make more mistakes as well-the
point simply is that there is no way to know for sure as a matter of theory.
90. See Kirgis, supra note 42, at 36.
91. COHEN, supra note 88, at 11 app. A.
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the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the verdict or findings
(18.7 percent), error in granting or denying judgment
notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") or directed verdict (15.6
percent), improper evidentiary rulings (11.9 percent), or error in
ruling on a new trial motion (10.1 percent).92
Finally, and most importantly, the reversal rate greatly
overstates the extent of trial court errors.93 As with the reversal rate
for arbitration awards, the better comparison is the rate of reversals
as a percent of all decisions, not just those appealed. Because the
number of cases with appeals is only a small percentage of all cases
terminated in the district courts, the reversal rate for all cases is much
less than the 30 percent reported by Kirgis.94 For example, based on
data reported by Judge Jon 0. Newman, only 3.99 percent of all civil
case terminations in the Second Circuit from 1990-1991 resulted in
appeals, so that the reversal rate of all district court civil cases was
1.08 percent.9 5 Interestingly, this rate is very similar to the reversal
rate of arbitration awards by courts found by Hoyman and
Stallworth.96
Overall, the evidence on whether arbitrators follow the law in
their awards is inconclusive. Certainly there are some cases in which
arbitrators do not follow the law, and arbitrators responding to
surveys indicate that they do not always follow the law in making
their awards.97 But the evidence does not show the extent to which
arbitrators differ from judges in this regard. One respect in which
arbitrators may differ from judges is in the depth of their legal
analysis: a study of labor arbitration awards finds that analysis of
statutes by labor arbitrators often is "cursory and conclusory."9
92. Id.. The report notes that such grounds for appeal "often" raise underlying issues not
reflected in the appendix. Id.
93. One might also wonder who benefits from the appeals process. Kevin Clermont and Ted
Eisenberg find that "defendants succeed more than plaintiffs on appeal from civil trials," and
conclude that the reason is that "the appellate court is more favorably disposed to the defendant
than either the trial judge or the jury." Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia
in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differfrom Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 947, 947; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or
Judge Trial: Defendants'Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 125 (2001) (noting that in civil
trials, "defendants succeed more than plaintiffs on appeal ").
94. See Kirgis, supra note 42, at 36.
95. Newman, supra note 88, at 632, 637 n.7.
96. See supra text accompanying note 84.
97. Greenfield, supra note 44, at 689-90, 694.
98. Id. at 694.
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Although the study does not examine whether more thorough
analysis would have changed the results in the cases, it does give
reason to wonder whether that may be true.
III. Is ARBITRATION

"SELF-DEREGULATION"?

A second question is whether parties provide for arbitration in
order to avoid mandatory legal rules-i.e., whether businesses use
arbitration, in the words of Paul Carrington, to "self-deregulate."99
Carrington explains his view as follows: "It is of course only natural
that parties with greater economic power would (if permitted) seek
by adhesion contracts to self-deregulate by gaining control of dispute
resolution procedures through the terms of standard form
contracts." ' He criticizes the Supreme Court's arbitration cases as
"a serious impairment of the tradition of private law enforcement and
the creation of a system of self-deregulation comforting to business
predators.""'' The difference between this question and the previous
one is that this question focuses on the behavior of the parties rather
than the behavior of the arbitrators.
The evidence that corporate parties use arbitration to avoid
mandatory legal rules is rather thin, to say the least. In a 1997 survey
of general counsel or chief litigation attorneys of Fortune 1000
companies,102 36.9 percent of those responding agreed that their
companies used arbitration because it "[a]voids legal precedents."'0 3
Conversely, 48.6 percent of the respondents cited the fact that
arbitration is "[n]ot confined to legal rules" as a barrier to its use."
99. Carrington, supra note 16, at 370; see also Schwartz, supra note 30, at 53 ("Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Clauses as Corporate Self-Deregulation"). Jean Sternlight has described arbitration as
"do it yourself' tort reform. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 11 (2000). I take this

to be a somewhat broader criticism, including not only the avoidance of substantive law but also
procedural differences between arbitration and litigation (such as the lack of class relief). It may
be that Carrington intended his phrase "self-deregulation" to include procedural and other
differences between arbitration and litigation as well. My focus here, however, is limited solely
to the narrower meaning described in the text.
100. Carrington, supra note 16, at 370.
101. Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the "National Policy" of the Supreme Court, 3

NEV. L.J. 259, 288 (2002-2003).
102. DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF
CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS

(1998). Lipsky and Seeber reported "a response rate of well over 60 percent" among the Fortune
1000 companies. Id. at 8.
103. Id. at 17 tbl.15.
104. Id. at 26 tbl.22.
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Most construction company executives responding to a survey by
Murray S. Levin and Doug Joyce seemed to believe that arbitrators
favored equitable solutions over decisions based on the law." 5 "Only
7%... disagreed with the statement that 'arbitrators are more
concerned with achieving equitable results than with strict adherence
to law,"' while only 17 percent agreed that "'the fact that arbitrators
do not strictly adhere to rules of law negatively affects the fairness of
arbitration.""'10 6 By comparison, in a survey of transactional lawyers

by Celeste Hammond, over 70 percent of respondents "expected that
the arbitrator was required to apply a rule of law to the dispute.' ' 7
The studies thus are mixed, although they do reveal a perception
among at least some parties that arbitrators do not always follow the
law. But whatever the studies may suggest about party perceptions,
they provide little evidence on how often parties actually agree to
arbitrate for that reason.
Studies examining the use of arbitration agreements, by contrast,
fail to find evidence that parties are using arbitration to avoid
mandatory legal rules. In the franchising context, Keith Hylton and I
examined the factors that explain the use of arbitration clauses in a
sample of franchise agreements from major franchisors." 8 A number
of states have adopted statutes limiting the grounds on which
franchisors can terminate franchisees.0 9 If franchisors use arbitration
to avoid application of these franchisee protection statutes, one
would expect franchisors located in states with such statutes to be
more likely to include arbitration clauses in their franchise
agreements than those located in states without such statutes. In fact,
the study finds the opposite: all else equal, franchisors in states with
franchisee protection statutes are less likely to include arbitration
clauses in their franchise agreements than those in states without

105. See Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the
Importance of Volition, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 105, 160-61 (1997) (summarizing the survey results).
106. Id.
107. Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre)(As)sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding
Arbitration Contracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional
Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 589, 613 & n.201 (2003). The respondents also believed that
arbitrators ordinarily issued reasoned awards and that courts could review awards for legal error.
Id. at 614-15 & n.221.
108. Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration:An Application to FranchiseContracts,32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003).
109. See id. at 563-64.
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Franchisors respond to enactment of franchisee
such statutes. "'
protection statutes in other ways, such as by increasing the number of
company-owned outlets relative to franchised units, but apparently
not by including an arbitration clause in their franchise agreements.l"
While the study certainly is not conclusive," 2 to my knowledge it is
the only study to examine systematically the factors explaining the
use of arbitration clauses in standard form contracts.
The evidence from international arbitration is similar. No one
has yet done the sort of regression analysis that has been done with
franchise arbitration." 3 But the reported data reveals that very few
parties to international arbitration agreements contract to have their
disputes resolved using the lex mercatoria or otherwise without the
application of national law. Table 1 summarizes data published by
the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce ("ICC"), the "central institution" in international
commercial arbitration." 4 In the substantial majority (between 77 and
81 percent) of arbitrations administered by the ICC, parties specified
a particular national law to govern their contract." 5 In only 2 percent
of the
of arbitrations (or fewer) did parties contract for application
6
decision."
of
rules
a-national
other
some
or
lex mercatoria

110. Id. at 577 ("The estimated marginal effect suggests that if you compare similar
franchisors, one based in a state with a franchisee protection statute and the other not, the
probability of an arbitration agreement is lower by .45 for the franchisor based in the state with
the protection statute.").
111. Id.
112. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA.
L. REV. 363, 424 (2003) ("Alhough the authors concluded that these data indicated that
arbitration was being used for purposes other than to avoid restrictive state law, it is at least as
likely that arbitration was a last resort substitute for contractual choice of forum in some cases.").
113. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration by the Numbers: The State of Empirical
Research on InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT'L 291, 305 (2006) (suggesting
such a study as a possible topic for future empirical research on international commercial
arbitration).
114.

See YVES DEZALAY &

BRYANT G.

GARTH, DEALING

IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 45

(1996).
115. Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the
New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 523, 539 tbl. 2 (2005).
116. Id. at 538-39.
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TABLE

1. APPLICABLE LAW IN ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSES

National Law
Other Rules
Applicable Law
Not Specified

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

77%
1%
22%

79.4%
2.3%
18.3%

80.4%
1.2%
18.3%

79.1%
1.3%
19.6%

79.3%
1.7%
19.0%

Sources: 2001 Statistical Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring 2002, at
12; 2002 Statistical Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring 2003, at 14;
2003 Statistical Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring 2004, at 13; 2004
Statistical Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring 2005, at 11; 2005
StatisticalReport, ICC INT'L CT.ARB. BULL., Spring 2006, at 11.

In a sample of international joint venture contracts, a somewhat
higher percentage (four of fifteen, or 26.7 percent) of arbitration
clauses referred to either "international legal principles and
practices" or "general international commercial practices.""' 7 But in
every case, the choice of the lex mercatoria was to fill gaps in the
absence of national law, not to supplant existing legal rules.1 8
Although parties can contract out of national law in international
arbitration, very few appear to do so."' In short, studies to date find
no evidence that parties seek to contract out of mandatory legal rules
by use of arbitration.
IV. DOES ARBITRATION IMPEDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW?
A third respect in which arbitration is asserted to be lawless is
that it weakens or interferes with the development of the law. When
parties agree to arbitrate, they remove the case from the public court
system to a system of private dispute resolution. No court will decide
the case, and no court will issue a published opinion to serve as
precedent for future decisions. Arbitration awards are unlikely to
provide a substitute source of precedent, the argument goes, because
they may not contain a statement of reasons and often are

117. Id. at 540.
118. All of the clauses were in contracts between American and Chinese parties, and three of
the four clauses contained language to the effect that transnational law was to apply only "if there
is no published and publicly available law in China pertaining to any particular matters relating to
this Contract." See id. at 541.
119. See id. at 539 tbl. 2.
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unpublished. 2 ' Moreover, because there is no single unifying
decision maker, like a supreme court, conflicting awards may persist.
As William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner stated in their classic
article, Adjudication as a Private Good:
Private production of rules or precedents involves two
problems. First, because of the difficulty of establishing
property rights in a precedent, private judges may have little
incentive to produce precedents ....
The second problem with a free market in precedent
production is that of inconsistent precedents which could
destroy the value of a precedent system in guiding
behavior. "2'
Indeed, Judge Posner, in IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins.
Co., '22 described arbitration awards as "more like jury verdicts than
like the decisions of courts, and jury verdicts are not given any
' 23
weight as precedents."'
I pass over the numerous normative issues involved, such as:
How much law is enough law? Is publicly made law superior to
privately made law? To what extent can legislatures and regulatory
agencies satisfactorily fill in for "lost" judicial decisions? Instead, I
address only the available empirical evidence-such as it is. I
recognize the difficulty of quantifying or even measuring the
development of the law and the extent to which arbitration may
interfere with that development. The discussion that follows
necessarily is subject to such difficulties.
Initially, the impact of arbitration must be evaluated, not in the
abstract, but against the alternatives. Most cases in court do not make
it to trial, much less appeal. 124 Cases that settle do not create law,
unless the court rules on a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment before the settlement. Nor do jury verdicts,
120. Alderman, supra note 6, at 11-12.
121. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STuD. 235, 238-39 (1979).
122. 136 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 1998).
123. Id. at 543.
124. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federaland State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459-60 (2004); Marc Galanter &
Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (noting that roughly two-thirds of cases settle and many others are
resolved prior to trial).
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although the judge's instructions or an opinion on appeal might. 2 '
Moreover, the vast majority of cases, including most of those
appealed, present essentially factual disputes rather than disputes
over unsettled issues of law. 2 6 Thus, it is the rare case that
contributes to the development of the law in a significant way." 7
The extent to which arbitration results in legal issues being
excluded from the public courts depends on the extent to which
parties include arbitration clauses in their contracts (or draft standard
form contracts that include arbitration clauses). It is, of course,
possible that parties may agree to arbitrate after a dispute arises, and
thus remove an issue from court at that time. But the use of postdispute arbitration agreements is rare relative to the use of predispute arbitration agreements.2 8 Thus, the key measure is the
proportion of a particular type of contract that includes pre-dispute
arbitration clauses.
Table 2 summarizes the available empirical evidence. Almost 90
percent of a sample of international joint venture contracts included
arbitration clauses, the highest percentage of any type of contract
listed.2 9 By comparison, the next highest is consumer financial
125. See supra text accompanying note 95.
126. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 88, at 11 app. A (finding that the "primary" issue on appeal
was the "[m]isapplication of substantive law or evidentiary law to the facts or improper jury
instructions on law or evidence" in only 20.5 percent of state court appeals studied.). The same is
true for cases in arbitration. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, ArbitralLaw-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1183, 1205 (2004) ("A perusal of recent employment arbitration awards revealed that the vast
majority of the awards are purely factual determinations.... About seven percent of the awards
are the equivalent of substantial judicial opinions on employment law."); see also Hoyman &
Stallworth, supra note 80, at 53 (noting that 84 percent of arbitration awards involved "factual
claims of discrimination").
127. Of course, even cases presenting factual issues can contribute to the development of the
law by clarifying the application of the law in particular factual circumstances.
128. Stephen R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), ICC INT'L CT.ARB.
BULL., Spring 1990, at 14, 15 ("Of the cases submitted to the ICC Court, only four [out of 237] in
1987 and six [out of 215] in 1989 resulted from a compromis, that is, an agreement to submit an
already-existing dispute to arbitration. The other cases arose from clauses compromissoires, that
is, an arbitration clause agreeing to submit future disputes to arbitration."), reprintedin TOWARDS
A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, supra note

26, at 65, 67; Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibilityof PostDispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 314 (2003)
("Analysis of data from the American Arbitration Association ('AAA') reveals that post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate employment disputes are rare, despite the widespread availability of this
option. Only about 6% of all employment arbitration comes from post-dispute agreements.").
129. For some other types of international contracts, however, it appears that a much smaller
percentage include an arbitration clause. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Flightfrom Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held
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contracts, of which 69.2 percent included an arbitration clause (and
over 30 percent did not).13° But certain types of consumer financial
contracts (and consumer contracts generally) may include arbitration
clauses at an even higher rate than the category as a whole. Certainly
that is true for brokerage contracts, 3 ' and may be true for insurance
and credit card contracts as well.'32 Conversely, Table 2 shows that
some types of consumer contracts almost never include arbitration
clauses. 3 3 The use of arbitration clauses in commercial contracts
varies widely as well.33 Thus, the extent to which arbitration
removes cases from the court system varies by type of contract, but
for most types of contracts at least some disputes likely will continue
to end up in court. Only in relatively limited areas does it appear that
arbitration might completely remove cases from the courts.
TABLE

2. USE OF PRE-DISPUTE

ARBITRATION CLAUSES BY TYPE OF CONTRACT
PERCENTAGE OF

INDUSTRY
1

Consumer

CONTRACTS WITH
ARBITRATION

SAMPLE

CLAUSE

SIZE

35

Housing and Home
Services
Retail Services
Transportation
Health Care

37.1%

n=35

30.0%
50.0%
35.3%

n=10
n=20
n=17

Companies' Contracts 25 tbl. 4 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 06-023 & New
York University Law and Economics Research Paper Series No. 06-35, 2006).
130. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55, 63-64 tbl. 2 (2004).
131. All four investment contracts in the study included arbitration clauses, see id., which is
not surprising given the ubiquitous use of arbitration in the securities industry.
132. See id. (finding 81 percent (seventeen of twenty-one) of various types of insurance
contracts and 76.5 percent (thirteen of seventeen) of various types of credit card contracts
included arbitration clauses).
133. See id.
134. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 129.
135. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 130, at 63-64 tbl. 2.
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TABLE 2. USE OF PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION CLAUSES BY TYPE OF CONTRACT (CONT.)
PERCENTAGE OF
CONTRACTS WITH
ARBITRATION
INDUSTRY

Food & Entertainment
Travel
Financial

SAMPLE SIZE

CLAUSE

0%

n=20

13.6%
69.2%

n=22
n=26

10.0%
41.6%

n=200
n=375

56.0%

n=125

19.0%
0.7%
15.0%
10.5%
24.3%
17.5%
2.0%
0%
0%
5.6%
0%

n=368
n=151
n=60
n=382
n=37
n=268
n=196
n=337
n=170
n=36
n=48

Employment
Law Firms 136
CEOs'
Franchising'3 8
Commercial

39

Mergers
Bond Indentures
Settlements
Securities Purchase
Licensing
Asset Sale Purchase
Credit Commitments
Underwriting
Pooling & Servicing
Security Agreements
Trust Agreements

136. Brett A. Smith & Joshua L. Schwarz, Keeping Lawyers Out of Court? A Survey of the
Prevalence of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Law Firms, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
183, 197-98 tbls. I & 2 (2003).
137. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 234 (2006).
138. Combines results from Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 695, 727 (2001), with results from William L. Killion, An Informal Study of
Arbitration Clauses Reveals Surprising Results, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 79, 79 (2002).
139. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 129.
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TABLE 2. USE OF PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION CLAUSES BY TYPE OF CONTRACT (CONT.)
PERCENTAGE OF
CONTRACTS WITH
ARBITRATION
INDUSTRY

CLAUSE

SAMPLE SIZE

International
Joint Ventures 140

Other Commercial

141

88.2%

n=17

20.8%

n=236

I know of no empirical evidence on the extent to which

arbitration awards are reasoned or what proportion of reasoned
awards are published. In international arbitration, the expectation is

that awards will be reasoned, 142 and a nonrandom but growing sample
of awards is published.1 43 Labor arbitration awards and securities
arbitration awards likewise are published,' 4 as are employment
awards in arbitrations administered by the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA").145 All filings, including awards, under the

AAA Class Arbitration Procedures are publicly available,'46 as are
filings and awards in NAFTA investor-state arbitrations. 47 But the
default rule under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules is that no

reasons need be given for the award, and as a general matter

140. Drahozal & Naimark, supra note 26, at 59.
141. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 129.
142. E.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 32(3), G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/31/17
(Dec. 15, 1976) (requiring arbitrator to state reasons for the award).
143. Drahozal, supra note 113, at 294.
144. E.g., NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10330(e) & (f) (Nat'l Ass'n Sec.
Dealers, Inc. 2006) (all awards shall state a summary of issues and be made publicly available).
For employment discrimination claims, the award must also set out "a statement regarding the
disposition of any statutory claim(s)." Id. § 10214. One certainly might wonder whether such
awards would contain sufficient reasoning to serve as precedents.
145. EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, R. 39(b) (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n 2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28481 (award "shall be
publicly available, on a cost basis"); see AAA Employment Awards Database,
http://www.adr.org/AAAAwards (last visited Oct. 8, 2006) (including AAA employment
arbitration awards since January 1999).
146. SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, R. 9(a) (Am. Arbitration Ass'n
2003), availableat www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy.
147. See Christopher S. Gibson & Christopher R. Drahozal, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Precedent in Investor-StateArbitration, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 521 (2006).
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commercial arbitration awards are not published.'48 Interestingly,
those areas in which the use of arbitration is most widespreadinternational contracts and securities disputes-seem to have greater
public availability of awards than some other areas.
When arbitration awards are published, there is evidence that the
awards do serve as precedent in future arbitration proceedings,
although only as persuasive rather than binding authority.
Christopher J. Bruce examined labor arbitration in the United States
and Canada and found that the "evidence... overwhelmingly
supports the contention that a private arbitration system is able to
produce consistent, precedential rulings."' 49 He found that arbitrators
and publishers made awards available to the public and that decisions
of arbitrators were consistent and predictable-at least sufficiently so
that users did not demand an appellate authority. 5 °
In addition, arbitration awards by the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal regularly are cited both by lawyers and by arbitration
tribunals in investor-state arbitration proceedings; 5 ' indeed, the
practice of citing prior awards appears to be a general one in
international commercial arbitration.'52 But unlike Bruce's
characterization of the labor arbitration market, users of international
arbitration have expressed concern about the consistency of
precedents in international arbitration. For example, commentators
have pointed to conflicting awards on particular issues made by
investor-state arbitration tribunals, 53 and some have called for the
creation of an appellate international arbitration court to review
conflicting awards by arbitral tribunals.'54
148. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, R. R-42(b) (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 2005),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (stating that arbitrators need not give reasons
for their award).
149. Christopher J. Bruce, The Adjudication of Labor Disputes as a Private Good, 8 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 3, 9 (1988).
150. Id. at 9-10.
151. Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 147, at 540-44.
152. See Carbonneau, supra note 126, at 1204-05 ("A process of stare decisis has emerged
regarding transborder arbitral awards." (citing in particular the Court of Sports Arbitration)).
153. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521, 1558 (2005) (finding inconsistencies in "the Lauderarbitrations, the SGS arbitrations, and a
series of cases under NAFTA").
154. See id. at 1606-10 (describing proposals); Howard M. Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st
Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving Disputes on the Enforceability of
ArbitralAwards, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA
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Again, the normative question of the costs and benefits of such a
proposal is beyond the scope of this article. The point instead is
twofold: first, the available evidence suggests that some system of
precedent is likely to develop when arbitration awards are published;
second, the evidence as yet is inconclusive as to whether the
precedent produced by an arbitration system is sufficiently consistent
to provide the certainty needed by parties.
V. CONCLUSION

Commentators mean various things when they describe
arbitration as "lawless." One meaning is simply that arbitrators need
not and sometimes (or often) do not follow the law in their decisions.
Another meaning is that parties use arbitration to avoid application of
mandatory legal rules. A third meaning is that arbitration diverts
cases from the public court system and hence impedes the
development of law by the courts. It certainly is plausible that
arbitration is "lawless" in each of these senses. On occasion
arbitrators do not apply the law. Some parties probably do provide
for arbitration to avoid mandatory legal rules. Courts issue fewer
precedents because cases are decided in arbitration instead. But
anecdotes provide a highly incomplete view of arbitration's asserted
lawlessness.
The empirical evidence discussed in this article provides a fuller
picture of arbitration, one that is at best inconclusive about the extent
to which arbitration is "lawless." The attitudes of arbitrators toward
following the law do not appear all that different from the attitudes of
judges (much less jurors), although the analysis of legal issues in a
'
sample of labor arbitration awards was "cursory and conclusory. 155
Reversal rates of arbitration awards (even when reviewed de novo)
are similar to reversal rates of trial court decisions on appeal-and
relatively low. The only studies of why parties agree to arbitrate find
no indication that they do so to avoid application of mandatory rules
of law. Finally, the effect of arbitration on the development of the
law is likely limited to certain substantive areas (in industries with
extensive use of arbitration clauses), and even then published
arbitration awards may serve as persuasive precedent in some cases.
CENTENARY CONFERENCE 111 (Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995); Charles N. Bower, A Crisis of

Legitimacy, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B9.
155. Greenfield, supra note 44, at 694.
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Clearly more research is needed to evaluate the extent to which
arbitration actually is "lawless." The research to date, however,
suggests that perhaps arbitration is less lawless than is sometimes
feared.
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